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Abstract. This study uses a structural equation approach to assess the presence of a credit
supply effect in the commercial mortgage market and the lenders’ ability to incorporate
expectations about this effect into their lending policies. A credit supply effect is deﬁned
as the effect of mortgage supply on the level of loan defaults. The empirical analysis
shows two important results. First, changes in loan defaults appear to be preceded by
changes in commercial mortgage supply with a lag of approximately four to ﬁve years.
Second, lenders tend to behave myopically, failing to incorporate expectations about the
credit supply effect into their lending policies. Additionally, a simulation suggests that
adequate timing of the mortgage supply cycle is crucial in limiting the incidence of
mortgage default.
Introduction
This study uses a structural equation approach to assess the presence of a credit supply
effect in the commercial mortgage market and the ability of commercial mortgage
lenders to incorporate expectations about this effect into their lending supply
strategies. For the purpose of the discussion, a credit supply effect is deﬁned as the
effect of mortgage supply on the level of loan defaults.
A credit supply effect arises from the interaction between the real estate capital and
space markets. As Mueller (1995) explains, the interaction between these two markets
is such that ﬂuctuations in the real estate capital cycle are related to ﬂuctuations in
the real estate space cycle, and viceversa. The implication is clear: changes in the
supply of capital may lead to changes in the supply of space and, consequently, to
changes in vacancies and rents. In the highly leveraged commercial real estate market,
the suggestion is that changes in the supply of mortgages may affect not only the
projects’ rents but also the likelihood that borrowers repay their loans. Under this
argument, the more willing lenders are to undertake a liberal lending policy the less
likely projects are to succeed and the more inclined borrowers are to default, holding
space demand and other factors constant.1
This being the case, lenders must aim to design loan supply policies that account for
the cyclical link between mortgage supply and loan defaults. For various reasons,
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however, they may fail to do so. First, as Born and Pyhrr (1994) and Pyhrr, Born,
Robinson and Lucas (1996) show, lenders may inappropriately rely on trend-based
analyses, which assume that current market conditions continue to hold in the future.
As a result, lenders may form property return expectations that are extremely high at
the peak of the cycle and extremely low at the trough of the cycle. That is, lenders
may undertake extremely liberal lending policies at the peak of the cycle and
extremely conservative lending policies at the trough of the cycle. Second, lenders
may rely too much on the views of developers. Developers tend to be optimistic about
their plans and such optimism could lead lenders to unusually liberal lending policies.
This argument is supported by Gardner (1993), who identiﬁes the optimism of
developers as a factor in the formation of construction cycles. Finally, lenders may
be inﬂuenced by regulatory measures, as pointed by DeGennaro, Lang and Thomson
(1993).
Some believe that the presence of a credit supply effect and the lenders’ inability to
predict this effect were critical to the commercial mortgage market crisis of the late
1980s and early 1990s. Hendershott and Kane (1992) argue that excess mortgage
supply was an important factor in the market downturn. They refer to the liberal
increase in the ﬁnancing of commercial real estate as a ‘‘lending frenzy’’ that led to
disproportionate space supply, low property returns and high levels of default. In their
view, regulatory legislation introduced in the early 1980s was a reason for the lenders’
decision to increase ﬁnancing at the expense of risk control.2 Follain, Hendershott and
Ling (1992) describe such a liberal lending as the greatest disturbance to commercial
real estate markets in the 1980s, emphasizing how excess mortgage supply led to
increasing space supply and decreasing proﬁtability.
Others, however, think that the presence of a credit supply effect and the lenders’
inability to predict this effect were not crucial. Cole and Fenn (1994), for example,
indicate that although the liberal mortgage supply of the mid- and late-1980s could
have helped increase bank failures, it was not the underlying factor. They study the
relation between real estate lending and bank failures and show that moral hazard
factors, including management’s risk preferences, could have been more important.
Vandell (1992), in turn, suggests that the credit supply effect may not have been
signiﬁcant. This conclusion is based on a forecasting model of commercial foreclosure
rates, which in his view fails to support the belief that the commercial mortgage crisis
was caused by the volume of lending of the mid-1980s.
This article reconsiders the issue by modeling the commercial mortgage lending
decision with lags and loan default expectations. The analysis offers an alternative
view of the commercial mortgage lending decision and extends the limited research
devoted to the commercial mortgage market. The results can be summarized as
follows. First, the empirical analysis suggests that the effect of mortgage supply on
future loan defaults is signiﬁcant. The results support the argument that a liberal
supply of commercial mortgage credit can make property investors more likely to
default if the ﬂow of space associated with the ﬂow of mortgages is not adequately
absorbed. Second, the results do not support the hypothesis that lenders incorporate
loan default expectations into their lending supply decisions. In this regard, the resultsAVAILABILITY OF CREDIT AND LOAN DEFAULT 177
indicate that the myopic lending supply behavior is not solely a characteristic of the
mid- and late-1980s, a period of extensive regulatory changes. Third, the results
suggest some form of forward-looking credit spread decisions. Interestingly, during
periods other than the 1982–1989 liberal lending period, lenders seem to incorporate
very short-term projections of loan defaults into their credit spread decisions.
Conversely, during the 1982–1989 liberal lending period, lenders do not appear to
adopt any type of forward-looking expectations. During this period, lenders fail to
increase the credit spread even as mortgage delinquency rates increase. Fourth, a
simulation shows that correct timing of the mortgage supply cycle would have been
helpful in maintaining a successful lending supply strategy during the mid- and late-
1980s. The simulation illustrates how a decrease in the ﬂow of mortgages during this
period would have kept mortgage delinquencies within reasonable levels. These results
are important for commercial mortgage lenders, investors, developers and regulators
subject to the risks associated with an oversupplied mortgage market.
This article is organized as follows. The next section looks at the interaction between
mortgage supply and loan defaults throughout the commercial mortgage cycle. The
following section presents the empirical analysis of commercial mortgage lending and
includes discussions about the empirical framework, data and model. Next, a
simulation is used to examine the lenders’ ability to time the commercial mortgage
supply cycle. The ﬁnal section is the conclusion.
Commercial Mortgage Supply and Loan Defaults
This section anecdotally describes the interaction between mortgage supply and loan
defaults. The analysis uses semiannual data on new mortgage commitments and loan
delinquencies from the American Council of Life Insurance (ACLI).3 The data cover
the 1975–1997 period. This section explores the presence of a credit supply effect by
focusing on the correlation between lagged mortgage supply and loan defaults.
The semiannual ﬂow of new mortgage commitments by ACLI reporting life insurance
companies has ﬂuctuated signiﬁcantly over the last couple of decades (see Exhibit 1).
The series ﬁrst presents an increasing trend between 1975 and 1979. Then, because
of the recessions of the early 1980s, the supply of funds decreases. The series goes
from about $8 billion at the end of 1979 to less than $2 billion at the end of 1981.
With the economy recovering, the series begins an upward trend that extends from
the ﬁrst semester of 1982 to the second semester of 1986. The ﬂow of credit remains
in the $6–$12 billion range between 1987 and late 1989. At that point, lending is
reduced and the series decreases to almost $2 billion in the second half of 1991, when
a new upward trend begins.
The rate of loan delinquencies that the ACLI report appears to react to changes in
mortgage supply (see Exhibit 2). This rate is in the 4% range during the mid–1970s
and then decreases to the 1% range, accompanying the restrictive lending period of
the early 1980s. As the economy recovers, the series takes an upward trend that
reaches the highest point in 1992 at more than 7%. This level of default appears
associated with the increased ﬂow of credit that accompanied the deregulation of the178 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
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banking industry. Only after lenders reduce the supply of credit does the mortgage
delinquency rate begin to decrease, falling in the 1%–2% range in 1997.
Correlations between lagged mortgage commitments and loan delinquencies (for lags
between one and ten years) are presented in Exhibit 3. The correlation increases as
the lag between mortgage supply and mortgage delinquency increases. At lags of
zero, one and two years, the correlation is not signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level, with values
of 20.128, 20.056 and 0.162, respectively. At lags of four to seven years, however,
the correlation is positive and signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level. The correlation increases
from 0.388 at a lag of three years and 0.535 at a lag of four years to 0.626 at a lag
of ﬁve years and 0.658 at a lag of six years. The correlation then decreases to 0.518
at a lag of seven years. Finally, at lags of eight, nine and ten years, the correlation is
not signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level, with values of 0.328, 20.053 and 20.457,
respectively.
The positive and signiﬁcant correlations at lags of four to seven years are consistent
with the presence of a credit supply effect. The results support previous ﬁndings by
Snyderman (1991, 1994) and Ciochetti (1997), who reveal that levels of foreclosure
rise rapidly from mortgage origination, peak at approximately ﬁve years from
origination, and then decline, with most foreclosures occurring within eleven years
since origination. Note that the analysis uses new mortgage commitments as a proxy
for mortgage supply and that there is a period, usually between six months and one
year, between the commitment and the actual mortgage disbursement. As a result, the
correlation between mortgage commitment and mortgage delinquencies at a lag of n
periods implies that the effect between mortgage disbursement and mortgage
delinquencies actually occurs with a lag of approximately n 2 1 periods. The presence
of a credit supply effect becomes particularly apparent during the liberal lending
period of the mid- and late-1980s. During this period, excess ﬁnancing of income-
producing real estate apparently led to disproportionate space supply, low property
returns and signiﬁcant default losses.
Empirical Analysis: Credit Supply Effect and Lending Decisions
The purpose of the empirical analysis is to assess the presence of a credit supply
effect in the commercial mortgage market and the ability of commercial mortgage
lenders to incorporate expectations about this effect into their lending supply
strategies. This discussion is presented in three parts. The ﬁrst describes the empirical
framework and data. The second presents summary statistics. Finally, the third
discusses the empirical model.
Empirical Framework and Data
The empirical analysis is based on a structural equation approach with lags and loan
default expectations. The proposed behavioral model includes three equations with
three endogenous variables: mortgage supply (represented by the ﬂow of commercial
mortgages), loan default (represented by the rate of commercial mortgageAVAILABILITY OF CREDIT AND LOAN DEFAULT 181
Exhibit 3
Correlation between Commercial Mortgage Delinquencies and Lagged
Commercial Mortgage Supply, 1975:1–1997:1
Commercial Mortgage Supply (Lag by Year)
0 1 23456789 1 0
Rate of 20.128 20.056 0.162 0.388 0.535 0.626 0.658 0.518 0.328 20.053 20.457
Delinquencies (0.402) (0.720) (0.313) (0.015) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.083) (0.794) (0.022)
Note: Number in parentheses represent p-values.
Source: ACLI, 1975–1997 Surveys.
delinquencies) and credit spread (represented by the difference between the average
commercial mortgage lending rate and the 10-year Treasury rate). The loan default
equation provides information about the signiﬁcance of the credit supply effect.
Similarly, the mortgage supply and credit spread equations provide information about
the lenders’ ability to incorporate loan default expectations into their lending supply
policies. Data for the analysis have been obtained from ACLI’s Survey of Mortgage
Commitments, ACLI’s Mortgage Delinquency Reports and the Citibase Database.
Equation (1) deﬁnes commercial mortgage supply as a function of expected loan
defaults, while controlling for the lending rate and a set of exogenous factors. The
equation has the form:
e S 5 ƒ( p ui(r, d), Z ), (1) tt t 1nt t t s t
where St represents commercial mortgage supply at time t and represents
e p tt 1n
expectations formed at time t about loan defaults at time t 1 n. For the purpose of
the empirical analysis, the variable t is speciﬁed as the actual value of loan defaults
e pt1n
at time t 1 n. Since St is lagged with respect to t , this speciﬁcation is consistent
e pt1n
with the need to test the lenders’ ability to forecast actual future loan defaults,
controlling for other variables in the model. Additionally, it is the lending rate at time
t, rt is the 10-year Treasury rate at time t, dt represent the endogenous credit spread
at time t and Zst is a vector of exogenous factors that affect lending supply decisions.
The vector Zst, is represented by the inﬂation rate at time t, referred to as inƒt, which
controls for inﬂationary trends that affect capital allocation decisions.
Equation (2) deﬁnes future loan defaults as a function of the lagged mortgage supply,
while controlling for the lagged lending rate and a set of lagged exogenous factors.
The lending rate consists of the 10-year Treasury rate and the credit spread. The
equation is expressed as:
p 5 ƒ(Sui(r, d), Z ), (2) t1nt t t t p t
where St, it, rt and dt stand as deﬁned earlier, while pt1n measures loan defaults at182 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
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time t 1 n, and Zpt represents a set of economy- and loan-related exogenous factors
that affect property performance. The vector Zpt includes the unemployment rate at
time t, referred to as unemt, which control for ﬂuctuations in the economy that affect
loan defaults, as well as the loan-to-value ratio at time t, ltnt, and the debt coverage
ratio at time t, dcrt.
Equation (3) endogenously deﬁnes the credit spread as a function of expected loan
defaults, while controlling for the Treasury rate and a set of exogenous factors. This
equation takes the form:
e d 5 ƒ( p ur, Z ), (3) tt t 1nt d t
where dt, as deﬁned earlier, represents the endogenous credit spread at time t, while
t represents expectations formed at time t about loan defaults at time t 1 n and rt
e pt1n
is the treasury rate at time t. Again, t is speciﬁed as the actual value of loan e pt1n
defaults at time t 1 n. As noted, this speciﬁcation is consistent with the need to test
the lenders’ ability to forecast actual future loan defaults, controlling for other
variables in the model. Additionally, Zdt represents a set of exogenous underwriting
factors that determine the credit spread decision. The set includes factors that inﬂuence
the lenders’ credit spread decision. They are the size of the loan at time t, loant, the
term of the loan at time t, termt, the loan-to-value ratio at time t, ltnrt, and the debt
coverage ratio at time t, dcrt.4
Data for the estimation of these equations are obtained from three sources. First,
commercial mortgage supply data, represented by commercial mortgage
commitments, are obtained from the ACLI Survey of Mortgage Commitments. Data
on commercial mortgage rates, mortgage terms, loan size, debt coverage ratios and
loan-to-value ratios are also obtained from this survey. Second, loan default data are
obtained from the ACLI Mortgage Delinquency Reports. Loan default data are
represented by the reported rate of ACLI mortgage delinquency.5 Finally, data on 10-
year Treasury rates as well as inﬂation and unemployment rates are obtained from
the Citibase Database. Commercial mortgage rates from the ACLI Survey of Mortgage
Commitments are combined with 10-year Treasury rates from the Citibase Database
to calculate the credit spreads. Also, all dollar amounts are adjusted for inﬂation using
a CPI measure.6
In sum, the simultaneous equation model is speciﬁed as:
e S 5 a 1 ap 1 a (d 1 r) 1 ai n f1 e , t 01 tt 1n 2 tt 3 ts
p 5 b 1 bS1 b (d 1 r) 1 b unem 1 bl t nr 1 b dcr 1 e , (4) t1n 01 t 2 tt 3 t 4 t 5 tp
e d 5 c 1 cp 1 cr1 c loan 1 c term 1 cl t nr 1 c dcr 1 e , t 01 tt 1n 2 t 3 t 4 t 5 t 6 td
where all variables stand as deﬁned earlier, while a, b and c represent parameters and
e is the error term.7 The behavioral model shown in Equation (4) captures several
relations implied in the literature. The use of the interest rate, loan default expectationsAVAILABILITY OF CREDIT AND LOAN DEFAULT 183
Exhibit 4























Mean 2.93 2.9 10.3 12.5 8.36 71.4 1.33
Std. Dev. 1.56 1.5 2.0 5.5 4.88 2.7 0.09
Min. 0.48 0.8 7.5 6.6 4.69 65.9 1.22
Max. 7.10 7.3 15.2 22.3 37.65 77.5 1.56
Source: ACLI, 1975–1997 surveys.
and inﬂation as explanatory variables in the mortgage supply equation partially reﬂects
the characteristics of the mortgage supply equation of Martin and Smyth (1991). The
relation between mortgage supply and underwriting standards such as the loan-to-
value ratio and the debt coverage ratio, as suggested by Ambrose, Benjamin and
Chinloy (1996), enters the mortgage supply equation via the endogenous credit spread
variable. Finally, the relation between loan defaults and loan characteristics such as
the loan-to-value ratio and debt coverage ratio follows the intuition behind Vandell
(1992) and Vandell, Barnes, Hartzell, Kraft and Wendt (1993)’s models.8 As speciﬁed,
Equation (4) complies with the order and rank conditions required for proper
identiﬁcation of the model.
Summary Statistics
Selected statistics for the ACLI data are presented in Exhibit 4. The data set, which
covers the 1975:1–1997:1 period, is semiannual (although most data are available on
a quarterly basis, the ACLI delinquency data are semiannual in some periods). The
semiannual inﬂation-adjusted ﬂow of new commercial mortgage commitments by the
ACLI reporting life insurance companies shows an average annual ﬂow of $2.93
billion. A minimum value of $480 million was reached around the 1981 recession
and a maximum value of $7.10 billion reached in 1986 during the period of liberal
lending that preceded the most recent commercial mortgage crisis. The mortgage
delinquency series shows an average level of 2.9%. The lowest level of delinquencies
is 0.8%, reached at the close of the 1970s, while the highest level is 7.3%, reached
in 1992 at the bottom of the commercial mortgage downturn. The commercial
mortgage rate has a mean value of 10.3%, ranging between 7.5% and 15.2%. Other
variables are also reported in Exhibit 4. The mortgage term has an average of 12.4
years, with a low of 6.6 years and a high of 22.3 years. The reported inﬂation-adjusted
dollar amount per individual loan shows an average of $8.4 million, with a minimum
of $4.69 million and a maximum of $37.65 million. The debt coverage and loan-to-
value ratios show average values of 1.33 and 71.3%, respectively. The debt coverage
ratio ranges between 1.22 and 1.56, while the loan-to-value ratio ranges between
65.9% and 77.5%.184 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
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Empirical Model
The three-equation structural model is estimated in a ﬁrst difference form to avoid
the impact of autocorrelated errors. The ﬁrst difference form is speciﬁed with no
intercept term.9 The estimation is based on a three-stage least square method that
controls the problems associated with simultaneous equation bias, while accounting
for correlation of errors across equations.10 The estimated model is:
ee DS 5 a D p 1 a (D * D p ) 1 a D(d 1 r) 1 a Dinƒ 1 e , t 11 tt 1n 12 pt t 1n 2 tt 3 ts
Dp 5 b DS 1 b Dd 1 b Dunem 1 b Dltnr 1 b Ddcr 1 e , t1n 1 t2 t3 t 4 t 5 tp
ee Dd 5 c D p 1 c (D * D p ) 1 c Dr 1 c Dloan t 11 tt 1n 12 pt t 1n 2 t 3 t
1 c Dterm 1 c Dltnr 1 c Ddcr 1 e , (5) 4 t 5 t 6 td
where D is a ﬁrst difference operator, St, it, dt, rt,, unemt, inƒ, loant, termt, ltnrt
e p tt 1n
and dcrt stand as deﬁned earlier, while a, b and c represent parameters and e is the
error term.
As shown in Equation (5), the model also includes a slope dummy variable that
accounts for the peculiarities of the 1982–1989 period of liberal lending. The slope
dummy variable is motivated by the argument that the lending behavior of the mid–
and late–1980s was not typical. During this time, lending decisions may have been
associated with regulatory factors that affected the lenders’ forecasting ability.11 The
multiplicative dummy variable, Dp, is 1 for the 1982–1989 liberal lending period and
0 for the rest of the series. Accordingly, the resulting (Dp * Dt ) interactive variable e pt1n
is Dt for the 1982-1989 period and 0 for the rest of the series. The variable (Dp
e pt1n
* Dt ) shows changes in the slope of Dt , namely changes in the lenders’ ability ee pp t1nt 1n
to predict changes in loan defaults from one period to the other.
Estimates of Equation (5) are presented in Exhibit 5. Following the timeframe of the
preliminary correlation analysis, the estimates are presented for annual lags, n,
between one and ten years. The columns in Exhibit 5 show estimates (for each lag)
for the three equations, while the rows show the explanatory variables. The exhibit
also shows, for each equation, the root mean squared error (RMSE) and the Durbin
Watson (DW) Statistic. In interpreting the results, two issues are important. First, is
the nature of the credit supply effect, as inferred from the relation between loan
defaults at time t 1 n, pt1n, and the supply of mortgages at time t, St. This relation is
shown under the loan default equation columns in Row 2. Second, is the lenders’
ability to incorporate loan default expectations into their lending supply strategies, as
inferred from the signiﬁcance of the expectation variable, t , in the mortgage supply e pt1n
and credit spread equations. This relation is shown under the mortgage supply and
credit spread equation columns in Row 2.
Credit supply effect. This part of the analysis focuses on the relation between loan
defaults at time t 1 n, pt1n, and the supply of mortgages at time t, St . The objective
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.AVAILABILITY OF CREDIT AND LOAN DEFAULT 187
defaults, while controlling for the other variables. The null hypothesis that the
coefﬁcient of the lagged mortgage supply variable, St, in the loan default equation is
less than or equal to zero is tested against the alternative hypothesis that the coefﬁcient
is positive. Under the alternative hypothesis, increases in commercial mortgage supply
at a given time lead to increases in future mortgage delinquencies, holding the lending
rate, the unemployment rate, the loan-to-value ratio and the debt coverage ratio
constant.
As Exhibit 5 shows across Row 1, the relation between pt1n and St is signiﬁcant at a
0.05 level (using a one-tail test), at lags of three and ﬁve years, and remains signiﬁcant
at most lags between 6 and 10 years. In all cases, the relation exhibits positive
coefﬁcients. The coefﬁcient of the St variable in the loan default equation with a lag
of ﬁve years has the highest level of signiﬁcance, with a t-Statistic of 2.3. This
equation also has the best ﬁt relative to the signiﬁcance of the St coefﬁcient, with a
RMSE of 1.1%.12 In this equation, the estimated coefﬁcient of the St variable is 0.3%
and its approximated standard error is 0.1%. This coefﬁcient can be interpreted as the
average percentage change in mortgage delinquencies associated with a change of $1
billion in the ﬂow of mortgages, about 5 years earlier, when other factors are held
constant. This result corroborates the presence of a credit supply effect that appears
to peak at a lag of approximately four to ﬁve years. As noted, the analysis uses new
mortgage commitments as a proxy for mortgage supply. Because of the period
between the commitment and the actual mortgage disbursement, the correlation
between mortgage commitment and mortgage delinquencies at a lag of ﬁve years
implies that the effect between mortgage disbursement and mortgage delinquencies
actually occurs with a lag of approximately four to ﬁve years.
Incorporating loan default expectations into lending supply strategies. The lenders’
ability to incorporate expectations about future loan defaults into their lending
decisions is measured by the signiﬁcance of the expectation variable, t , in the e pt1n
mortgage supply and credit spread equations. The null hypothesis that the coefﬁcient
of t in the mortgage supply equation is greater than or equal to zero is tested e pt1n
against the alternative hypothesis that this coefﬁcient is negative. Similarly, the null
hypothesis that the coefﬁcient of the expectation term, t , in the credit spread e pt1n
equation is less than or equal to zero is tested against the alternative hypothesis that
this coefﬁcient is positive. If the null hypotheses were rejected, the results would
imply forward-looking lending policies. Otherwise, they would imply myopic lending
behavior.
The results can be observed in Exhibit 5, Row 2. On the one hand, the null hypothesis
that the coefﬁcient of the loan default expectation variable at time t 1 n, t ,i nt h e e pt1n
mortgage supply equation is negative cannot be rejected. In other words, the
hypothesis that lenders behave myopically when making decisions about mortgage
supply is not rejected. Although the relation between St and t in the mortgage e pt1n
supply equation has p-values under 0.05 level (using a one-tail test) at lags of four,
ﬁve, seven and eight years, the coefﬁcients do not have the expected negative sign.
On the other hand, the relation between credit spread at time t, dt, and the loan default
expectation variable, t , in the credit spread equation is signiﬁcant at a 0.05 level e pt1n188 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
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(using a one-tail test) at a lag of one year. The coefﬁcient of the t variable is 1.0% e pt1n
and its approximated standard error is 0.5%. This coefﬁcient can be interpreted as the
average percentage change in credit spread as a result of a 1% change in expected
mortgage delinquencies (one year ahead), when other factors are held constant. In
short, the results do not support the argument that lenders incorporate loan default
expectations into their lending supply decisions. However, they imply some form of
short-term forward-looking behavior associated with credit spread decisions.
The last portion of the analysis focuses on the coefﬁcient of the interactive variable
(Dp * Dt ). Exhibit 5, Row 3, shows that this variable is not signiﬁcant at any lag e pt1n
in the mortgage supply equation. This result implies that the lenders’ inability to
incorporate expectations about loan defaults into their lending supply decisions is
exhibited in all periods, including the 1982–1989 liberal lending period. Conversely,
the multiplicative dummy variable is signiﬁcant at the 0.07 level (using a two-tail test)
in the credit spread equation at a lag of one year. The result suggests that the slope
of t changes from positive to negative during the 1982–1989 liberal lending period, e pt1n
implying that in the 1982–1989 period the hypothesis of forward-looking credit spread
behavior does not hold.
Summary of results. The empirical analysis shows three fundamental results. First, the
analysis supports the argument that a liberal supply of commercial mortgage credit
can make property investors more likely to default if the space supply associated with
the ﬂow of mortgages is excessive. That is, they support the existence of a credit
supply effect. Second, the observations fail to support the argument that lenders look
forward when making lending supply decisions. In this regard, the results suggest that
the myopic lending supply behavior is not solely a characteristic of the 1980s, a period
of extensive regulatory changes. Finally, the results suggest some form of forward-
looking credit spread decisions. Interestingly, during periods other than the 1982–
1989 liberal lending period, lenders seem to incorporate very short-term expectations
of loan defaults into their credit spread decisions. Conversely, the forward looking
expectation hypothesis does not hold between 1982 and 1989, a period characterized
by decreasing credit spreads and increasing loan delinquencies. These results are
important in two ways. First, the limited forward-looking lending behavior implies
that borrowers usually compensate lenders for past lending mistakes. If so, the analysis
provides a partial explanation for the increasing demand of alternative lending
vehicles, such as mortgage securitization or real estate investment trusts (REITs).
Second, the results show that lenders fail to increase the credit spread even as default
rates increase. This observation corroborates the argument that the regulatory
measures of the early 1980s encouraged lenders to increase their level of lending
regardless of the risk consequences.
Two additional issues deserve attention. On the one side, the interest rate variable, (dt
1 rt), is signiﬁcant in the mortgage supply equation, with a negative sign. This result
is consistent with the notion that lenders restrain the supply of mortgages at high
levels of interest rates, in part because of the possibility of an adverse selection effect.
This argument can also explain the increasing mortgage supply of the mid– and late–
1980s, when interest rates decreased signiﬁcantly, compared to the levels of the lateAVAILABILITY OF CREDIT AND LOAN DEFAULT 189
1970s and early 1980s. On the other side, the 10-year Treasury rate appears signiﬁcant,
with a negative sign, in the credit-spread equation. This result is inconsistent with the
argument that the low risk associated with a low interest rate should translate, holding
other things constant, into a lower credit spread. This observation may have to do
with the incoherence that characterized the lending policies of the mid– and late–
1980s.13
Timing the Cycle: Actual vs. Normative Mortgage Supply
The empirical analysis suggests that the tremendous increase in mortgage
delinquencies in the 1982–1989 liberal lending period is associated with a credit
supply effect and the lenders’ inability to predict future loan defaults. A simulation is
conducted to illustrate the extent to which adequate timing of the mortgage supply
cycle would have limited the incidence of mortgage delinquencies. The structural
equation model is simulated to estimate the level of supply that would have been
consistent with the expected level of mortgage delinquencies implied in the actual
credit spreads.
The implied level of delinquencies is derived using estimates from the credit spread
equation, for a lag of one year. This equation is solved for the t variable, given e pt1n
actual credit spreads and other estimates in the model. The actual and implied
delinquency rates are presented in Exhibit 6. The two series coincide before the 1982–
1989 period, which is consistent with the idea that before the regulations of the early
1980s lenders were more cautious about how to set the credit spread. Conversely, the
two series diverge during the 1982–1989 liberal lending period and through 1996.
This result corroborates that during the 1982–1989 period lenders failed to increase
the credit spread even as default rates increased, in part because of the regulatory
incentives of the early 1980s.14
A simulation is conducted to estimate the level of supply that would have been
consistent with the implied delinquency rates. This simulation is based on estimates
from the loan default equation, for a lag of ﬁve years.15 The simulated mortgage
supply series, which provide a normative representation of the mortgage supply cycle,
is presented in Exhibit 7. The plot of the actual and normative mortgage supply series
conﬁrms that achieving the implied mortgage delinquencies would have required a
reduced level of mortgage supply. The normative mortgage supply series ranges from
approximately $9 billion in 1977 to zero or negative lending in 1980, 1981 and 1985.16
The series is above $7 billion in 1983, slows down for about two years and then
increases to reach $6 billion in 1986 and 1987. At that point, the normative series
slows down again, increasing again to approximately $5 billion in 1990 and 1991.
The simulation suggests that adequate timing of the mortgage supply cycle would
have limited the incidence of mortgage delinquencies observed during the 1982–1989
liberal lending period. The gap between the actual and the normative series represents
the excess ﬂow of funds injected into the market. This gap shows that lenders fail to
assess the effect of mortgage supply on future loan defaults. The result is consistent
with the assessment that lenders rely excessively on trend-based, rather than cycle-190 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
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based, analyses. As Wolfson (1994) notes, the real estate downturn appears to be the
result of incorrect expectations of speculative increases in the price of commercial
real estate, which is consistent with the argument that lenders form property return
expectations that are extremely high at the peak of the cycle. While regulatory
measures contributed to the liberal lending behavior, the lenders’ inability to assess
the credit supply effect multiplied the consequences.
Conclusion
This article empirically explains the behavior of the commercial mortgage supply
cycle. The estimated model examines the effect that the ﬂow of mortgages has on
loan delinquencies and the lender’s ability to adjust the availability of credit in
response to this effect. Particular emphasis is placed to understanding the 1982–1989
liberal lending period that preceded the most recent commercial mortgage crisis.
Several results are worth noting. First, the estimates indicate that changes in loan
defaults follow changes in the ﬂow of commercial mortgage credit. In other words,
they conﬁrm the presence of a credit supply effect. Second, the hypothesis that lenders
behave myopically when making decisions about mortgage supply is not rejected.
Although the estimates suggest some form of forward-looking behavior associated
with credit spread decisions, they do not support the argument that lenders include
forward-looking expectations about loan defaults when designing their lending supply
strategy. Third, a simulation of the commercial mortgage supply series provides a
normative representation of the lending cycle. The simulation shows that if lenders
had properly incorporated loan default expectations into the lending supply decisions
the expansion of the cycle during the 1982–1989 period would have been less intense.
The simulation shows that correct timing of the lending supply cycle would have been
helpful in maintaining a successful lending supply strategy.
These empirical observations are valuable for lenders, CMBS and REIT security
investors, developers and regulators. For lenders, the results have important loan
underwriting implications. Loan underwriting decisions are usually based on a set of
borrower and property characteristics. Given the results of the model, loan
underwriters should also consider the effect of the ﬂow of capital on the riskiness of
the investments. Holding borrower and property characteristics constant, loan-
underwriting standards should get stricter as the supply of ﬁnancing increases.
The results have portfolio allocation and risk management implications for investors.
They may ﬁnd it in their interest to keep away from risky security investments as the
ﬂow of capital increases. As shown during the second half of 1998, investors may
ﬁnd it beneﬁcial to limit the purchase of CMBS, among other securities, if the
possibility of capital and space oversupply increases.
The results have important project feasibility implications for developers. They should
arguably look at the ﬂow of mortgage supply as a leading indicator of future space
supply. Under this view, they should adopt cycle-based, as opposed to trend-based,
feasibility approaches that account for the cyclical nature of the credit supply effect.AVAILABILITY OF CREDIT AND LOAN DEFAULT 193
Finally, for regulators the results have important economic policy implications. As
Eppli and Shilling (1995) show, the commercial mortgage crisis in the mid– and late–
1980s could be blamed, at least in part, for the slow economic growth of the late
1980s and early 1990s. Hendershott and Kane (1992) illustrate this point by showing
that overbuilding transformed approximately $100 billion of productive resources into
vacant real estate. They conﬁrm that the value of resources misallocated (as a result
of overbuilding) is an economic cost associated with inappropriate lending. Regulators
should look at this experience and realize the importance of maintaining standards
that control the speed at which capital ﬂows into the real estate market.
In sum, the results show lenders, investors, developers and regulators the credit supply
effect inherent to the commercial lending supply cycle. The overall results indicate
that making lending, investment, development, or regulatory decisions requires some
form of forward-looking expectations about the effect that the ﬂow of commercial
mortgages has on future loan defaults, and that failure to do so may translate into
signiﬁcant losses. This requirement has increasing importance as the sources of
commercial property ﬁnancing, including CMBS and REIT, expand.
Endnotes
1 This view is consistent with more general discussions about the interdependence of the supply
and demand functions in the credit markets. Hillier and Ibrahimo (1993) and Stiglitz (1987),
for instance, explain this issue and discuss how in certain cases the supply of credit may affect
the riskiness of the projects in which borrowers invest.
2 Important regulatory legislation that affected commercial real estate lending was introduced
in the 1980s. A critical piece of legislation was the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions
Act of 1982, which attempted to strengthen the thrift industry by creating new lending
opportunities. However, there was also regulation that affected developers. Hendershott and
Kane (1992) show that Federal Tax laws introduced in the 1980s encouraged developers to
undertake projects by providing generous depreciation allowances. These two regulatory efforts
together created the conditions for the dramatic real estate market crisis of the late 1980s and
early 1990s.
3 The ACLI data include aggregate summary reports for mortgage commitment and loan
delinquency activity (the data do not include loan-by-loan information). Note that although most
data are available on a quarterly basis, the ACLI delinquency data are semiannual in some
periods. As a result, the ﬁnal data set is semiannual.
4 It is possible to include St in Equation (3) and interpret the credit spread equation as the
demand equation. However, using St as a measure of demand and supply implies that all loans
demanded are actually offered. Specifying a demand equation would require data on the volume
of loans requested, which are not available.
5 The series used as a proxy for mortgage defaults is the ACLI series for delinquent loans
including loans in foreclosure for all loans types combined (1-4 family, commercial and farm).
6 The adjustment for inﬂation is done with a CPI measure whose base year is 1982–1984.
7 This speciﬁcation implies that the dependent variable of the loan default equation, pt1n,
coincides with the explanatory variable, t , in the mortgage supply equation. If so, the
e pt1n
simultaneous equation system should be estimated through an instrumental variable method (an
ordinary least squares method would create a bias where some independent variables would be194 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
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correlated with the error term). As the SAS Institute’s SAS/ETS User’s Guide (1993) shows,
an instrumental variable method such as the two- or three-stage least square methods replace
the independent variables in question with predicted values, obtained through a preliminary
‘‘instrumental’’ regression. Estimating the empirical equation through an instrumental variable
approach implies that the explanatory variable t in the mortgage supply equation is replaced e pt1n
with a prediction of this variable based on all other explanatory variables in the system. As
indicated, this estimation approach is consistent with the need to test the lenders’ ability to
forecast the actual value of pt1n, given all other information in the model.
8 Martin and Smyth (1991)’s model focuses on the residential market. They use a contemporary,
rather than expected, default rate and a measure of inﬂation costs, rather than the inﬂation rate.
The models in Vandell (1992) and Ambrose, Benjamin and Chinloy (1996) focus on the
commercial market.
9 The ﬁrst difference equations are estimated with no intercept because the intercept disappears
in the transformation of the level variables. See Lardaro (1992) and Maddala (1992).
10 For a discussion of the three-stage least square see the SAS Institute’s SAS/ETS User’s Guide
(1993).
11 The 1982:2–1989:2 period coincides with the passage of important regulatory legislation that
affected the commercial real estate lending process. In 1982:2, the Garn-St. Germain Depository
Institutions Act was signed into law (see Graddy, Kyle and Strickland, 1994). Although
regulatory measures were introduced as early as 1980 to provide thrifts with new investment
powers, the Garn-St. Germain Act served as a ﬁnal step toward the period that Hendershott and
Kane (1992) refer to as ‘‘lending frenzy.’’ As Follain, Hendershott and Ling (1992) document,
during this period savings and loans signiﬁcantly increased their commercial mortgage loan (at
an annual rate of 30% during the 1982–1984 period and at an annual rate of approximately
10% between 1984 and 1989). In 1989:2, in turn, the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery
and Enforcement Act (FIRREA), was signed into law (see Barth, Pugh and Jahera, 1995).
Handorf and Sachlis (1997) refer to FIRREA as the legislation that restricted the lenders’ability
to make commercial real estate loans. Similarly, Follain et al., refer to FIRREA as the legislation
that ended the lending frenzy in markets such as that for rental housing. As indicated by Fergus
and Goodman, Jr. (1994), the passage of FIRREA created the conditions for the beginning of
a credit crunch. For additional discussions about the role of the Garn-St. Germain Act, see Lary
(1989) and DeGennaro, Lang and Thomson (1993). Similarly, for additional discussions about
the role of FIRREA, see Madura and Whyte (1992) and Rosenblum and Clair (1993).
12 Looking at the value of the RMSE and the t-Statistic of the St variable simultaneously helps
identify equations where the RMSE is low relative to the signiﬁcance of the St variable.
Arguably, an equation could have a very low RMSE and yet have a nonsigniﬁcant St variable,
or viceversa. The interest in this analysis is in equations where the ﬁt is good (low RMSE)
relative to the signiﬁcance of the St variable (high t-Statistics).
13 Note that models of adverse selection actually imply that the relation between mortgage
supply and the interest rate is concave. The concave relation between the lending rate and credit
supply is important, for example, in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). To explore the possibility of a
concave interest rate relation, the structural equation model is estimated with an interest rate
squared term. However, this term is not signiﬁcant at any lag. Additionally, note that the relation
the credit spread and the 10-year Treasury variable may be particular to the 1982–1989 liberal
lending period. To explore this possibility, the model is estimated with an additional interactive
term. This term is deﬁned as the product of the 10-year Treasury variable and the multiplicative
dummy variable, Dp, The additional interactive term, however, is not signiﬁcant at any lag.
14 The coefﬁcient of the t variable, which approximates 1 point, indicates that lenders
e pt1n
expected full loss severity. Interestingly, this expectation is more than sufﬁcient relative toAVAILABILITY OF CREDIT AND LOAN DEFAULT 195
traditional levels of loss severity (as Snyderman (1991, 1994) reports, loss severity has ranged
from –7% to 96% in the 1972–1986 period). However, the entire credit spread is not sufﬁcient
to cover actual levels of loan delinquency. Even if the expectation seems more than sufﬁcient
to cover the losses associated with a 1% loan delinquency, the expectation of the total
delinquency rate is not appropriate (see Corcoran and Kau (1994) for a discussion of calculations
regarding loss severity and credit spreads).
15 As noted earlier, the loan default equation for a lag of ﬁve years has the best ﬁt relative to
the signiﬁcance of the St variable.
16 Zero or negative lending is assumed to represent points in the normative series with no
commitment activity and/or negative mortgage ﬂow.
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